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Abstract 
This study examines the effects of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China, United States (US), European 
Union (EU) and the rest of Asia on economic growth conditional on the institutional quality of sub-Sahara Africa 
for the period (2003-2012). We develop theoretical argument from the existing literature to show that institutional 
heterogeneity may be one of the description for mixed findings of previous empirical studies on the growth effects 
of Chinese FDI in Africa. We use rule of law to proxy for institutional quality. Using Panel Threshold Regression 
(PTR) model, we show that FDI from all these sources have a positive impact on growth only above certain 
thresholds of rule of law and these thresholds differ from one source to the other. However, for FDI from China 
and the rest of Asia, the difference is marginal. That is, the growth effect of FDI from Asia is positive in countries 
with governance rating of at least -0.89 while negative in countries falling within a range of -1.35 and -0.89. In 
terms of FDI from EU and US, beneficial outcomes on growth are realized in countries with governance rating of 
at least -0.90 and -0.62, respectively. These results confirm that China and the rest of Asia do invest in both weak 
and strong governance countries in sub-Sahara Africa although the impact is different. Whereas, US and EU seem 
to invest only in strong governance African countries. However, the former is more sensitive to institutional 
quality than the latter. 




The controversy surrounding the impact of Chinese FDI on growth in Africa can hardly be solved when all the 
African countries are regarded as one. The fact of the matter is that each African country is different from the 
other, and the structural relationships may vary from one country to the other. In line with the growing emphasis 
on the catalytic role of institutions on FDI-led growth (Peres et al. 2018; Jude & Levieuge 2015; AbuAl-Foul & 
Soliman 2014; Li & Hook 2014; Unsisa Yusufu 2013), this study associates African countries’ heterogeneity to 
the quality of institutions. In essence, Su & Ado (2016) suggest that an institutionally based approach may be 
most relevant in better explaining China’s Investment in Africa. This suggestion can equally apply to other sources 
of FDI in Africa. 
Various studies which explored the role of institutions on FDI-growth nexus used classical fixed-effects models 
to capture the impact of the interaction term between FDI and Institutional variable (Peres et al. 2018; Li et al. 
2014; Unisa Yusufu 2013).  Classical fixed-effects models cannot capture for varying slopes rather they reflect 
the heterogeneity of different countries in intercepts. Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model of Hansen (1999) 
provides a solution to this problem. PTR allows the estimated coefficients of some regressors to take different 
values subject to the value of another observable independent variable reaching the threshold. Thus, the model 
assumes that the threshold for regime switching is clearly defined. Gonzalez et al. (2005) relaxed this assumption 
to incorporate smooth transition regression (STR) in panels. The latter substituted indicator function in the PTR 
model with smooth distribution function to allow the estimated coefficients to gradually adjust as the system 
switches from one regime to the other. This approach is used in the studies of Jude et al. (2015) and AbuAl-Foul 
et al. (2014) 
The aforementioned studies used aggregate FDI data yet we seek to identify thresholds for a specific source of 
FDI in Africa. We seek to show how institutional quality in African countries can influence the growth effects of 
each source of FDI in the weak and strong institutions regimes. This implies that the threshold for regime 
switching should be clearly defined for each source of FDI and therefore PTR is appropriate for this study. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on the role of institutions 
towards FDI-led growth. We also discuss the relationship between institutions and FDI; and the direct relationship 
between institutions and economic growth. Section 3 describes the methodology, specifies the model and the 
estimation technique. Section 4 reports estimations results and finally, section 5 gives conclusion and 
recommendations based on main findings. 
2. The role of institutions on FDI-led growth 
It is widely acknowledged that institutions are upheld to make a difference to individual actors in society (North 
1990). This follows that various sources of FDI as actors in a society are likely to act differently conditional to 
the institutional structure of the host society. The empirical literature is still scarce to substantiate this argument 
although the existence of debate in the subject cannot be ruled away. For instance, Ayodele & Sotola (2014) claim 
that China does invest in African countries where Western investors are not willing because Chinese investors 
hardly take account of institutional quality. Likewise, Chen et al (2015) assert that the Chinese portion of FDI in 
weak governance African countries surpasses that of Western investors. The latter further argue that the impact 
of Chinese FDI on growth is approximately the same between weak and strong governance countries in Africa. 
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However, Renard & John (2011) suggest that the benefits of China's investment can be realized if Africa works 
on improving its governance. 
Institutions on their own have been proven to be crucial economic growth factors in various studies. For sub-
Sahara Africa in particular, McMillan & Harttgen (2014) and Rodrik (2014) argue that the growth miracle which 
took place between (2000-2009) was mainly driven by institutional reforms. Although the surge of FDI from 
China and other sources cannot be taken for granted, Rodrik (2014) suggests that institutions provide a base and 
framework for interaction with foreign investors. This could imply that FDI can either be unhealthy or beneficial 
to growth depending on the institutional quality of the host country. Weak governance performance tends to be 
associated with corruption, government ineffectiveness, poor regulation quality, ineffective rule of law, political 
instability and poor accountability among other governance factors. It is therefore unusual for FDI to be beneficial 
on the growth of such countries although Chen et al (2015) urge otherwise in the case of Chinese FDI in weak 
governance African countries.  
Jude et al. (2015) demonstrate various aspects in which the conditioning role of institutions on FDI-led growth 
nexus takes place.  First, the country's productivity prospects are shaped by institutions, hence, may attract more 
FDI. Second, weak institutions are detrimental to the business environment and therefore FDI-financed firms are 
highly sensitive to the governance framework of the host country. The first aspect concurs to the finding of Peres 
et al. (2018) which support the significance of institutions in attracting FDI in developing countries. Furthermore, 
Morrissey & Udomkerdmongkol (2012) argue that the extent at which FDI crowds out domestic investment is 
related to institutional quality in host countries. For sub-Sahara Africa in particular, Unisa Yusufu (2013) shows 
that institutional quality does not only attract FDI but also can amplify the growth effects of FDI in the continent.  
Unisa Yusufu (2013) adopted the Solow model to investigate the channels through which FDI can promote growth 
in Sub-Sahara Africa over the period (1981-2010). The channels investigated include human capital, institutions, 
infrastructure, and financial development. While using the system GMM method, the findings show that only 
institutions and financial development have a positive impact on the FDI-growth relationship in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. Likewise, Li et al. (2014) utilize the system GMM to estimate the role of institutions for the growth-
enhancing effect of FDI in a panel of 78 countries over the period (1981-2005). The results highlight the 
complementary effect in the middle of FDI and institutional quality where the impact of FDI on growth actually 
depends on the quality of institution in the host countries.  
Generally, GMM implies a linear reciprocal action between FDI and institutions in generating growth. In other 
words, a reform in institutional quality is assumed to have constant impetus on the marginal effect of FDI. 
Accordingly, the implied threshold only points out where the total marginal effects of FDI eventually turn positive. 
This idea was challenged by AbuAl-Foul et al. (2014) and Jude et al. (2015) through PSTR model of Gonz´alez 
et al. (2005), using evidence from MENA countries for the period (1984-2011) and 94 developing countries over 
the period (1984-2009), respectively.  Their results demonstrate how institutional quality reform does neither act 
linearly on the marginal effect of FDI nor reciprocate proportionally with effort, rather subject to the distributional 
position of the institutional variable.  
Furthermore, the studies also demonstrate how the recognized threshold is not necessarily the one that tips over 
the coefficient of FDI from negative to positive, as it is an endogenous one that shows the shift in the slope of the 
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FDI-growth regression (a shift that theoretically could occur between two positive slopes as well). Regardless of 
these notable differences in methodologies, the ultimate conclusion attained using both the system GMM 
estimator and the PSTR estimator reflect institutions as a modulator for FDI-led growth. 
3. Methodology 
This study follows Neuhaus (2006) by inputting inward stock of FDI in place of Human Capital in the augmented 
Solow Model of Mankiw et al. (1992). Hence we account for two types of physical capital stocks which are, 
domestic capital (ܭௗ) and foreign capital (ܭ௙). However, we go beyond FDI aggregate data and look at bilateral 
FDI data compiled by UNCTAD for the period (2001-2012). Thus, we build 12 years synthetic panel that allows 
us to overcome the very short time span of available bilateral FDI data between Africa and its key FDI sources. 
ܻሺݐሻ ൌ ܭௗሺݐሻఈܭ௙ሺݐሻఉܣሺݐሻܮሺݐሻଵିఈିఉ        (1) 
Where ܻ is aggregate output, ܭ is the stock of physical capital, ܣ is the productivity parameter, ܮ denotes labor 
input and the subscript ݐ represents time. ߙ and ߚ represent production elasticities and they are assumed to vary 
for the two types of physical capital stocks. Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001) point out that ܣሺݐሻ consists of two 
elements. One that accounts for various policy oriented variables such as institutional framework, inflation, terms 
of trade and other trade openness variables. The other element reflects exogenous technical progress, that is, all 
other unexplained trend growth variables which the model does not explicitly account for. 
Our model follows the neoclassical growth theories, therefore, we utilize changes in the log of per capita GDP in 
real terms as our dependent variable (݈݊ݕ௜௧ െ ݈݊ݕ௜௧ିଵ). The specification of our regressors incorporates 
fundamental determinants of the steady state, that is, lagged dependent variable (ݕ௜௧ିଵ), population growth rate 
(n), changes in technology (g), the rate of depreciation for capital stock (݀) and domestic investment savings rate 
(ݏௗ). The subscript (ݏ௙ሻ denotes for foreign investment savings rate. Other control variables ( ௜ܺ,௧) represent the 
components of A(t) and they are discussed below. The basic model can be summarised using the following 
econometric statement: 
݈݊ݕ௜௧ െ ݈݊௬௜௧ିଵ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ݈݊ݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ݈݊ݏௗ,௜௧ ൅ ∅݈݊ݏ௙,௜௧ ൅ ߮ ݈݊ሺ݊௜௧ ൅ ݃ ൅ ݀ሻ ൅ ߮ᇱ݈݊ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (2) 
where ߣ௧, ߟ௜, ߝ௜௧ proxy for period-specific effects that are assumed to affect all countries for example technology 
shocks, unobserved country-specific effects, and white noise error term respectively. In line with augmented 
Solow model of Mankiw et al. (1992), we assume the depreciation rate of the physical capital stock (d) and 
changes in technology (g) to be constant over time and equal to 0.05. Thus, Equation (2) can be presented as 
follows: 
݈݊ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ሺߚ ൅ 1ሻ݈݊ݕ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ݈݊ݏௗ,௜௧ ൅ ∅݈݊ݏ௙,௜௧ ൅ ߮ ݈݊ሺ݊௜௧ ൅ 0.05ሻ ൅ ߮ᇱ݈݊ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧  (3) 
3.1 Data and variable description 
This study measures per capita GDP in real terms for income levels, Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of 
GDP for domestic investment savings rate and the share of inward stock of FDI in GDP for the foreign investment 
savings rate. We use stock rather than flow data of FDI to capture for perpetual and some of the immeasurable 
effects of FDI on growth. Neuhaus (2006) argue that that the ratio of inward stock of FDI to GDP is more accurate 
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than flows in capturing for perpetual and some immeasurable effects of FDI on economic growth. FDI is 
differentiated between FDI from a particular source and FDI from the rest of the world (ROW) to sub-Saharan 
African countries. FDI from ROW is controlled by subtracting source’s FDI from the total inward stock of FDI 
to Africa. For population growth, we add 0.05 before generating logs. The components of ௜ܺ௧ include total natural 
resource rents as a percentage of GDP, changes in terms-of-trade and inflation rate. All these control variables are 
in logarithms except for changes in terms-of-trade, as the variable exhibit a large number of negative values. We 
use rule of law as the institutional quality variable. The summary of all the variable descriptions and data sources 
is provided in Table 1 below. 
Table1: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, constant 2010 US$  WDI (2019) 
Domestic Investment Goss Capital Formation,% of GDP WDI (2019) 
Population Growth Population growth rate in % WDI (2019) 
Terms of Trade Growth Changes in terms of trade in %, based on an index 2000=100 WDI (2019) 
Inflation GDP deflator, annual change in % WDI (2019) 
Institutional Quality 
Rule of Law: The estimates range from approximately -2,5 to 2.5 
indicating weak and strong governance performance respectively WDI (2019) 
FDI ROW 
Total inward stock of FDI from the rest of the world(Total inward 






Inward stock of FDI from China, USA, European Union and the 
Rest of Asia respectively,% of GDP 
UNCTAD 
stat (2019) 
Total Natural Resource 
Rent (% of GDP) 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. WDI (2019) 
 
The sample of this study is restricted by the availability of sound FDI bilateral data between African countries and 
the FDI sources considered in this study. The list of the sub-Sahara Africa countries utilises is given in Table 2 
below. 
Table 2: Sample 
Angola Benini* Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde 
Central Africa 
Republic  
Chad Comoros Congo Cote D'Ivoire DRC Equatorial Guinea Eritrea  Ethiopia 
Gabon The Gambia Ghana** Guinea 
Guinea-
Bissau* Kenya Lesotho Liberia 
Madagascar Malawi Mali* Mozambique Niger Nigeria  Rwanda* Sao Tome & Principe* 
Senegal* Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Swaziland Togo* Uganda Tanzania 
Zambia Zimbabwe                  
Notes: *countries with less than three observations of FDI from all the FDI sources for the period (2001-2012). 
The estimation of PTR using STATA is very sensitive to missing values hence, these countries were removed to 
obtain a strongly balanced panel data. We hardly could ipolate and epolate for the missing FDI values of the 
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removed countries. **The country was removed for the estimation of PTR relating to Chinese FDI only. For 2SLS 
analysis, we prefer to use the whole sample although the difference between the estimated coefficients obtained 
using the whole sample and those obtained using the reduced sample is statistically insignificant. 
3.2 Model Specification 
The main aim of this paper is to establish threshold level/s at which institutional quality can influence the growth 
effects of various FDIs in Africa. This requires a model with varying slopes so that it can capture the conditioning 
effects of institutions in Africa on the FDI-growth nexus in the ‘weak governance performing’ and ‘strong 
governance performing’ regime, respectively. The classical fixed effects cannot be appropriate because the model 
reflects the heterogeneity of different countries in intercepts.  Hansen (1999) proposed the Panel threshold 
regression (PTR) model which allows the estimated coefficients of some regressors to take different values subject 
to the value of another observable independent variable reaching the threshold. Thus, the model assumes that the 
threshold for regime switching is clearly defined. Later Gonz´alez et al. (2005) relaxed this assumption to 
incorporate smooth transition regression (STR) in panels, allowing the estimated coefficients to gradually adjust 
as the system switches from one regime to the other. However, the assumption relaxed by the latter accommodates 
the major objective of this paper hence we will stick to the former. PTR can account for different links in terms 
of statistical significance, magnitude and signs among or between variables of interest in distinct regimes. 
Allowing for fixed individual effects (ߤ௜) and given a non-time invariant institutional indicator (ݍ௜,௧) as a threshold 
variable, the PTR divides the observations into two or more regimes, depending on whether each observation is 
above or below a threshold level. The econometric equation of PTR model with two extreme regimes can be 
defined as follows; 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚ௜௧ᇱ ݏ௙,௜௧݃ሺݍ௜௧; ܿሻ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧        (4) 
Where ௜ܺ௧ proxies for fundamental Solow growth variables and other control variables discussed above excluding 
institutional quality indicator. The role of the threshold variable explains its absence in the main equation (Jude 
et al. 2015; AbuAl-Foul et al. 2014). This also controls for reverse causality and collinearity between governance 
indicator and other economic growth variables.   The subscript ݏ௙,௜௧ represents the inward stock of FDI while ߝ௜௧ 
is the error term. The binary transition function ݃ ሺݍ௜௧; ܿሻ	 divides the single threshold equation (4) into two regimes 
with coefficients ߚଵ and ߚଶ, where c is the threshold parameter. This translate equation (4) into the following 
equation: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ቊߤ௜ ൅ ߚଵ
ᇱݏ௙,௜௧ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧											݂݅	ݍ௜௧ ൑ ܿ	
ߤ௜ ൅ ߚଶᇱݏ௙,௜௧ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧											݂݅	ݍ௜௧ ൐ ܿ ,       (5) 
Equation (5) can be thought of as linear heterogeneous panel model with coefficients that vary across cross-section 
units and over time. Where the slope parameters satisfy;  
డ௬೔೟
డ௦೑,೔೟ ൌ ߚ௜௧ ൌ ൜
ߚଵ	݂݅	ݍ௜௧ ൑ ܿ
ߚଶ	݂݅	ݍ௜௧ ൐ ܿ,         (6) 
For multiple thresholds that is, models with ݎ ൅ 1 ൐ 2 regimes or threshold parameters ܿଵ, . . ܿ௥, the general 
specification is as follows: 
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ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ᇱ௥௝ୀଵ ݏ௙,௜௧Ι൫௖ೕషభழ௤೔೟ஸ௖ೕ൯ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧       (7) 
where Ι൫௖ೕషభழ௤೔೟ஸ௖ೕ൯ represents the indicator function and ܿ଴ ൌ െ∞ while ܿ௥ାଵ ൌ ൅∞. 
Equation (7) ought to be fitted sequentially for instance in the case of a double threshold that is, three regimes 
model the specification is presented below; 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚଵᇱݏ௙,௜௧ሺݍ௜௧ ൏ ܿଵሻ ൅ ߚଶᇱݏ௙,௜௧ሺܿଵ ൑ ݍ௜௧ ൏ ܿଶሻ ൅ ߚଷᇱݏ௙,௜௧ሺݍ௜௧ ൒ ܿଶሻ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (8) 
where ܿଵ ൏ ܿଶ. 
Notwithstanding uncertainty about the endogeneity bias and potential reverse causality, this study uses lagged 
FDI and lagged institutional quality indicator. This translates our equations of interest (equations (4) and (7)) into 
the following equations, respectively: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚ௜௧ᇱ ݏ௙,௜௧ିଵ݃ሺݍ௜௧ିଵ; ܿሻ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧       (9) 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ᇱ௥௝ୀଵ ݏ௙,௜௧ିଵΙ൫௖ೕషభழ௤೔೟షభஸ௖ೕ൯ ൅ ߮ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧      (10) 
3.3 Estimation Procedure 
The first test is conducted to determine the significance of the threshold effect in equation (9) (Hansen, 1999). 
Gonz´alez et al. (2005) refer to the procedure as a test for linearity against the equation (9). Jude et al. (2015) 
suggest the procedure as a homogeneity test of the FDI-growth coefficient conditional on threshold variable (ݍ). 
Despite differences in terminology, the threshold effect hypothesis in the equation (9) can be presented as follows; 
	ܪ଴: ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ  
The rejection of ܪ଴ is a confirmation that the two regimes nonlinear threshold model is appropriate otherwise, 
equation (9) collapses into a linear panel regression model with fixed effects. However, the main challenge is the 
presence of the nuisance parameter in ܪ଴. That is, the threshold parameter c is not identified under ܪ଴ Davies 
(1987). This problem renders the asymptotic distribution of ܨଵ statistic non-standard and in particular, dominates 
the Chi-squared distribution. One solution to the nuisance parameter issue is to use a bootstrap procedure proposed 
by Hansen (1996). The latter demonstrates that this bootstrap simulation produces first-order asymptotic 
distributions and therefore test statistic ܨଵ and the corresponding p-value attained from the bootstrap are 
asymptotically valid. The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic ܨଵ ൐ its critical value. 
Based on equation (10), the second step is conducted to discriminate between single and double threshold 
regression. In this context, ܪ଴: Single threshold regression. The hypothesis of the two regimes is rejected in favor 
of three regimes if  ܨଶ ൐ its critical value. A sequential procedure based on ܨଶ, . . ܨ௝  (until the corresponding ܪ଴ 
is accepted) allows the determination of the number of thresholds or regimes hence the appropriate regression. 
The corresponding asymptotic p-value for ܨଶ, . . ܨ௝ can again be estimated using bootstrap analog (Hansen 1999).  
4. Estimated Results 
This study uses rule of law as a proxy of institutional quality in Africa hence, the threshold variable. The variable 
has been drawn from six World Bank governance performance indicators based on the results of the pairwise 
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correlation matrix (Note 1). Although all the indicators are positively correlated to each other and statistically 
significant at 1%, rule of law has the highest correlation with the rest of the indicators. This is an indication that 
reform in rule of law is likely to have a positive bearing on all other governance indicators.  
Table 3 summarises the statistics of the threshold variable according to its minimum value, 25% quantile, 50% 
quantile, 75% quantile and the maximum value. The statistics are provided both in logs (row (1)) and in raw data 
(row (2)).  












ln  lagged Rule of Law (1) -1.329 -0.134 0.279 0.572 1.025 
Lagged Rule of Law     (2) -1.855 -1.248 -0.856 -0.384 0.668 
Notes: Authors own calculation based on rule of law data extracted from WDI (2019). The governance 
performance rating follows that of the World Bank where all governance indicators are rated on a scale ranging 
from -2.5 for weak and 2.5 for strong governance performance.  
With reference to the World Bank rating, the result shows that on average sub-Sahara African countries have a 
minimum, 50% quantile and maximum governance performance of -1.86, -0.86 and 0.67, respectively. Based on 
this scale, 50% quantile separates between weak and strong governance performing countries in the context of 
sub-Sahara Africa. Under a weak regime, the institutional quality of countries falling below 25% quantile is very 
weak. On the other dimension, countries above 75% quantile have very strong governance performance. 
Table 4 shows the results of the hypothesis of no threshold effects and the tests to determine the number of 




















Table 4: Test for threshold effects and number of regimes 
  Chinese FDI US FDI EU FDI ROA FDI 
Test for Single threshold (two regimes) 
F1 15.32 12.31 13.93 16.51 
P-Value 0.040** 0.060* 0.060* 0.020** 
1% critical values 18.09 17.77 15.32 20.51 
5% critical values 14.05 13.99 13.94 14.72 
10% critical values 12.60 10.48 10.83 11.42 
Test for Double threshold(three regimes) 
F2 18.63 9.73 9.88 16.19 
P-Value 0.020** 0.200 0.180 0.020** 
1% critical values 21.64 14.50 16.62 23.43 
5% critical values 15.42 12.55 13.87 13.97 
10% critical values 13.69 10.68 10.56 11.45 
Test for Tripple threshold(four regimes) 
F3 12.85 4.04 
P-Value 0.560 0.820 
1% critical values 36.43 92.08 
5% critical values 34.25 79.29 
10% critical values 30.17 49.49 
Notes: P-values and critical values are computed from 50 bootstrap simulations. F1 represents the Fisher type 
statistic associated with the test of H0 of no threshold against a single threshold. F2 corresponds to the test of a 
single threshold against a double threshold and F3 corresponds to the test of double threshold against a triple 
threshold. *significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level. 
The results show that the hypothesis of no threshold effects is rejected across all sources of FDI. For Chinese FDI 
and FDI from the rest of Asia, the test statistics  ܨଵ are both significant at 5% with corresponding bootstrap p-
values of 0.04 and 0.02, respectively. The test statistics  ܨଵ  of FDI from US and EU are both statistically 
significant at 10% with an equal corresponding bootstrap p-value of 0.06. Based on these results, the growth 
effects of FDI from various sources in Africa is proven to be conditional to institutional quality in the continent. 
A panel threshold model is thus appropriate with rule of law as the threshold variable. 
To determine the number of thresholds, the test statistics  ܨଶ  for Chinese FDI and FDI from the rest of Asia are 
both significant at 5% with an equal corresponding bootstrap p-value of 0.02. The test statistics for a third 
threshold  ܨଷ are however statistically insignificant implying that two thresholds are appropriate for PTR analysis 
of these sources of FDI. For FDI from US and EU, the results show that the tests for a second threshold ܨଶ are 
statistically insignificant implying that a single threshold is favorable for the PTR analysis of these FDI sources.  
Results of the threshold parameter estimates and their respective asymptotic 95% and 99% confidence interval 




Table 5: Threshold parameter estimates 
    Point estimate  95% Confidence Level 99% Confidence Level 
Chinese FDI Single threshold 0.206 [0.166, 0.228] [0.145, 0.228] 
 Double threshold -0.297 [-0.388, 0.251] [-0.388, -0.251] US FDI Single threshold 0.404 [0.364, 0.411] [0.068, 0.411] 
EU FDI Single threshold 0.202 [0.156, 0.219] [0.107, 0.218] 
ROA FDI Single threshold 0.206 [0.069, 0.223] [-0.030, 0.223] 
  Double threshold -0.264 [-0.479, -0.234] [-0.309, -0.234] 
The point estimates relating to Chinese FDI are -0.297 and 0.206 corresponding to World Bank governance 
performance rating of approximately -1.377 and -0.891 respectively. Table 3 conveys the information that -0.297 
lies below the 25% quantile while 0.206 lies slightly below the 50% quantile. For FDI from the rest of Asia, the 
point estimates are -0.264 and 0.206 corresponding to the governance performance rating of approximately -1.352 
and -0.891. The estimates of the latter resemble that of the former and this is not surprising since China is an Asia 
country. Thus three regimes indicated by the point estimates are those with ‘very weak’, ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
institutional quality. 
The results also show that estimated threshold parameters relating to FDI from US and EU are 0.404 and 0.202 
corresponding to World Banking governance performance rating of -0.622 and -0.896, respectively. Referring to 
the position of these parameters from Table 3, we derive that 0.404 falls way above the 50% quantile while 0.202 
lies slightly below the 50% quantile. Thus two regimes indicated by the point estimates are those with ‘weak' and 
‘strong' institutional quality. The asymptotic confidence intervals for the threshold are very tight across all the 
estimations, indicating little uncertainty about the nature of this division. 
Table 6 reports the main results of the PTR estimations. The regressions were conducted separately for FDI from 
China, US, EU and the rest of Asia and the estimates are presented in columns (1)-(4), respectively. Based on the 
results obtained in Table 4, column (1) and (4) shows estimates derived from a double threshold regression while 












Table 6: Fixed Effects PTR Results with FDI from China, US, EU and the rest of Asia 
Dependent Variable: In real GDP per Capita  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Dep Var 0.748*** 0.773*** 0.767*** 0.765*** 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
ln Domestic Investment 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ln Population Growth 0.016 0.009 0.012 0.008 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
ln Natural Resource Rents 0.004 0.005 0.007 -0.004 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
In inflation -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Terms to Trade growth 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
ln FDI ROW -0.176*** -0.146*** -0.132*** -0.164*** 
  (0.038) (0.047) (0.037) (0.031) 
ln FDI China 0.093 
  (0.124) 
ln FDI US   -0.042 
   (0.065) 
In FDI EU   -0.083* 
   (0.045) 
In FDI ROA  -0.296* 
   (0.146) ln ܨܦܫ௝߇ሺ.ሻ ߚଵ 0.027 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 
  (0.031) (0.019) (0.030) (0.029) 
 ߚଶ -0.114** 0.060*** 0.109*** -0.274*** 
  (0.047) (0.017) (0.024) (0.086) 
 ߚଷ 0.122***   0.131*** 
    (0.026)   (0.025) 
Observations 340 350 350 350 
Countries 34 35 35 35 
R-Squared (within) 0.871 0.862 0.866 0.872 
Notes: The subscript ݆ denotes FDI from a specific source while ߇ሺ.ሻ represents the indicator/transition function. 
For Chinese FDI, ߚଵ: ሺݍ௜௧ ൏ െ0.297), ߚଶ: (െ0.297 ൑ ݍ௜௧ ൏ 0.206) and ߚଷ: (ݍ௜௧ ൒ 0.206). For FDI from the rest 
of Asia, ߚଵ: ሺݍ௜௧ ൏ െ0.264), ߚଶ: (െ0.264 ൑ ݍ௜௧ ൏ 0.206) and ߚଷ: (ݍ௜௧ ൒ 0.206). For US FDI,	ߚଵ: ݍ௜௧ ൑ 0.404 
and ߚଶ:	ݍ௜௧ ൐ 0.404 while for EU FDI,	ߚଵ: ݍ௜௧ ൑ 0.202 and ߚଶ:	ݍ௜௧ ൐ 0.202. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.*significant at the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level. 
For the regressions relating to Chinese FDI and FDI from the rest of Asia, the	
ߚଵ,	ߚଶ, and ߚଷ estimated coefficients are associated to the regimes with ‘very weak’, ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ 
institutional quality, respectively. For the regressions relating to FDI from US and EU, the ߚଵand	ߚଶ estimated 
coefficients correspond to the regimes with ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ governance performance, respectively.  
11 
 
4.1 Discussion of the main parameters 
The estimated coefficients of ߚଵ are statistically insignificant across all the sources of FDI. This might be an 
indication that all the sources of FDI hardly invest in very weak governance performing countries although what 
could be very weak for EU and US can be mean for China and the rest of Asia. For FDI from China and the rest 
of Asia, the estimated coefficients of ߚଶ are negative and statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively while 
of ߚଷ are positive and highly significant. Thus, the growth effects of FDI from Asia including China are be realized 
in African countries that are above 25% quantile in terms of institutional quality. However, the impact is negative 
as long as the institutional quality is approximately below the 50% quantile. This finding contradicts the assertion 
made by Chen et al (2015) that Chinese FDI boost growth on both weak and strong governance countries. The 
results of this study show that only countries which are above 50% quantile yield positive growth effects of FDI 
from  China and the rest of Asia. Our finding is consistent to the study of Renard et al. (2011) which argued that 
full benefits of Chinese FDI can be realized if African countries work on improving their institutional quality. 
For regressions relating to FDI from US and EU, the estimated coefficients of ߚଶ are positive and highly 
significant. Notwithstanding that, the point estimate of the regression relating to FDI from US (0.404) is twice 
more than of FDI from US (0.202) (see Table 5). Table 3 shows that 0.404 lies far above 50% quantile while 
0.202 lies slightly below the quantile. This is an indication that favorable growth outcome of FDI from US can be 
realized only in strong governance performing African countries whereas FDI from EU enhances growth even in 
some countries with weak institutions. Precisely, those countries which are slightly below the 50% quantile tend 
to yield economic growth benefits from EU FDI.  
In line with Ayodele et al. (2014) our results show that China do invest is some African countries which EU and 
US seem to shy away and these are countries associated with weak governance. This finding is indicated by the 
statistically significant and insignificant estimated coefficients of  ߚଶ for Chinese FDI and; FDI from EU and US, 
respectively. In addition, the countries falling slightly above 50% quantile are regarded as weak by US. This result 
is indicated by the position of US FDI threshold point estimate from the 50% quantile. Fortunately, these countries 
are covered under the benefits coming from the EU and Asia FDIs. 
4.2 Discussion of control variables 
The results also show that the estimated coefficients of the convergence term, domestic investment, and terms of 
trade growth are standard relative to literature and highly significant across all regressions. Contrary to theory, 
the estimated coefficient of population growth is positive albeit statistically insignificant and small. The estimated 
coefficients of inflation and natural resource rents are very small and statistically insignificant. The estimated 
coefficients of FDI from the rest of the world separately controlling for all the sources of FDI considered in this 
study are all negative and highly significant. The estimated coefficients of FDI from China and US are statistically 
insignificant while those of FDI from EU and the rest of Asia are negative and statistically significant at 10%.  
4.3 Robustness checks 
We check the robustness of the PTR estimates using 2SLS estimator to account for probable endogeneity arising 
from specific FDI variables. The regressions are conducted with interaction terms between each source of FDI 
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and rule of law in Africa. The estimated results are presented in Table 7 below. Column (1)-(4) presents the 
estimated results with respect to FDI from China, US, EU and the rest of Asia, respectively.  
Table 7: Fixed-Effects 2SLS results with interaction terms. 
Dependent Variable: In real GDP per Capita  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Dep Var 0.726*** 0.724*** 0.725*** 0.733*** 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) ln Domestic Investment (0.013)** 0.012*** 0.013*** (0.013)*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) ln Population Growth -0.004 0.010 0.013 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) ln Natural Resource Rents 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) In inflation 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Terms to Trade growth 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) ln FDI ROW -0.062 -0.097 -0.067* -0.070* 
 (0.040) (0.073) (0.042) (0.039) ln FDI China -0.211** 
 (0.093) In FDI US  -0.058 
  (0.112) ln FDI EU  -0.039 
  (0.052) ln FDI ROA 0.017 
  (0.130) ln FDIj*ROL 0.028 0.036 0.026 0.030 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) Observations 252 227 240 244 
Countries 42 42 42 42 
R-Squared (within) 0.802 0.793 0.802 0.803 
Hausman/C test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.965 0.247 0.258 0.457 
Notes: The subscript j represents a specific source of FDI.  FDIj*ROL is the interaction term between an FDI from 
a specific source and rule of law in Africa. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at the 10% level; 
**significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level. In all regressions from column 1-4, specific FDIs are 
instrumented using their first three lags and the p-values of the Hausman test are <10% implying that 2SLS 
estimates are preferred to standard OLS fixed-effects estimates. All p-values of the Hansen test are >10% implying 
that the instruments used are valid. 
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The results show that only the estimated coefficient of Chinese FDI is negative and significant at 5% while those 
of other FDI sources are statistically insignificant. In terms of FDI from the rest of the world, the estimated 
coefficients are negative and significant at 10% only in the regression relating to FDI from EU and the rest of the 
word. Terms-of-trade growth estimated coefficient enter the model as expected albeit insignificant across all 
specifications while other control variables are robust. The estimated coefficients of all interaction terms are 
statistically insignificant. This result conveys the weakness of using the classical fixed-effects model to investigate 
the role of institutional quality on FDI-growth nexus. 
Despite the noted differences, both the fixed-effects 2SLS and fixed-effects PTR estimators concur on the same 
conclusion in that the direct impact of FDI from various sources in Africa is either negative or at best insignificant. 
This finding reinforces the argument that favorable growth effects of FDI on growth are not automatic rather 
subject to the institutional quality of the host country (AbuAl-Foul et al. 2014; Jude et al. 2015). 
5. Conclusion and recommendations 
In line with the growing emphasis on the catalytic role of institutions on FDI-led growth, we associate African 
countries’ heterogeneity to the quality of institutions and show how it can influence the growth effects of each 
source of FDI in the weak and strong institutions regimes, respectively. For this purpose, we use the PTR model 
with rule of law as a proxy for institutional quality to 35 sub-Sahara African countries over the period (2003-
2012). The sources of FDI considered in this study are China, US, EU and the rest of Asia. Conclusions drawn 
from our main findings are as follows; 
The growth effects of FDI from both China and the rest of Asia are analysed in three regimes with approximately 
the same threshold parameters. Due to this result, China is bundled together with the rest of Asia. The first regime 
constitutes of countries with very weak institutional structures and the impact of FDI from Asia on growth of 
these countries is non-significant. On average, countries belonging to the first regime have a governance 
performance of at most -1.35. The second regime constitutes of weak governance performing countries ranging 
between -1.35 and -0.89 on average. The impact of FDI from Asia is deleterious on the economic growth of these 
countries. The last regime constitutes of strong governance countries, performing above -0.89 on average and 
these are the countries which claim growth benefits from Asia FDI. 
Moreover, the impact of EU and US is unique from that of Asia in two ways. First, their impact on growth in 
Africa is divided upon weak and strong governance performing countries. Second, their impact of weak 
governance performing countries is non-significant. Our findings confirm that US and the EU investments’ are 
channelled towards African countries with relatively effective rule of law although the former is more sensitive 
than the latter. Whereas China do investment both in weak and strong governance countries. 
The difference between FDI from the EU and US lies in the threshold required to yield favorable growth outcome 
in strong governance performing countries. For FDI from US, the threshold point estimate is approximately -0.62 
on average compared to -0.90 for EU. Thus FDI from US can enhance growth only in countries with high-quality 
institutions while EU investment can boost growth starting from countries which are slightly below the 50% 
quantile. In a nutshell, US is more sensitive to institutional quality than EU and Asia, respectively. We therefore 
recommend that for African countries to win out of FDI from EU, Asia and US they have to reform their 
institutions to an average performance rate of at least -0.90, -0.89 and -0.62, respectively.  
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Another contention yet to be cleared is that Chinese Investment in Africa is earmarked for natural resources. Chen 
et al. (2015) argue that the motive is indifferent from Western investors. Generally, FDI earmarked for natural 
resources is considered unhealthy for the host economy due to resource curse (Hayat 2014) however, the threshold 
of the case is not known.  Hence, future researches can look at this aspect and take natural resource factor as a 
threshold variable. 
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Note1: Results of the pairwise correlation matrix are not presented in this paper however they can be made 
available on request.  
 
 
 
 
